Monday, April 16, 2018

And still darker: CSE stops reporting budget breakdown

The Main Estimates for fiscal year 2018-2019 were tabled today in parliament and — surprise! — CSE reported even less information than it has in the past.

Instead of providing a breakdown of its spending showing the amounts allotted to the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) program and the Information Technology Security (ITSEC) program, as it has done every previous year since 2012, this year the agency is providing only a single overall figure, with a paraphrase of the agency's motto, "Protect and Provide Information", offered in lieu of any actual explanation. Maybe we should be grateful that at least it wasn't provided in the original Latin.

In correspondence with me, after the original version of this article was posted, CSE said that the reduction in data was prompted by a change in the way the Treasury Board wants to organize this kind of reporting. To demonstrate their continued openness they tweeted the figures for 2018-19: $407,399,615 for the SIGINT program and $217,494,338 for the ITSEC program.

I commend CSE for doing that, but I still think the change is highly regrettable.

According to the agency, in the future the only routine public reporting of these numbers will be through the government's online data portal INFOBASE, where they will appear only sometime after the end of the relevant fiscal year. They will no longer appear in either the Estimates or the Public Accounts, or presumably in any other form of published paper documentation.

Posting out of date numbers on INFOBASE is certainly better than nothing, especially for people like me who study the history of the agency over a timeframe of decades.

But it is not good for people interested in current policy and plans. If you want to know how much the government proposes to spend in a particular year on Canada's cybersecurity, for example, or even whether that spending will be going up or down, you could very well be out of luck.

And that includes the MPs who will be voting to provide those funds, unless they elicit the numbers from CSE in committee testimony or otherwise. CSE promises that it will be providing those numbers to the committee that examines the Estimates. But even if that does happen every year without fail, it is no substitute for publishing them in a formal document available to all.

So, call it inadvertent or incidental, but this is a backward step, away from transparency.

CSE has repeatedly promised in recent years to increase the level of transparency about its operations, and it has been somewhat more open in certain ways.

But it has a long way to go to get back to the level of transparency that existed in 2011, and this is a step in the wrong direction.

Let's review some of the backward steps since 2011.

The last time CSE appeared in the Department of National Defence's Report on Plans and Priorities was in June 2011. A supplementary document called Section IV: Other Items of Interest contained an entire section on CSE. That document has been memory-holed entirely from the government's website, but I saved a copy back then, so you can read CSE's section here.

In that Golden Age of Transparency, CSE reported not only its 2011-12 total budget, but also a breakdown of its budget into Salary and Personnel; Operating and Maintenance; and Capital spending. It also provided projections of all those figures for the following two fiscal years, 2012-13 and 2013-14.

It also provided a list of the key government intelligence priorities that CSE would attempt to cover during the coming fiscal year and a description of some of the initiatives planned for that year, notably occupation of the building that became Pod 1 of CSE's new headquarters complex and the start of construction of the remainder of the complex.

Finally, the section reported the number of civilian full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) the agency would have in 2011-12 and projected numbers for the two following years (although to be fair the latter numbers, which were identical to the 2011-12 numbers, were probably intended just to be placeholders).

All that ended in November 2011 when CSE became a stand-alone agency. It no longer appears in DND's Report on Plans and Priorities (or Departmental Plan, as it is now known). Nor does it publish its own.

Neither does it publish a Departmental Results Report or an Annual Report (although under Bill C-59 there would be an Annual Report of some kind).

CSE did begin appearing under its own name in the Main Estimates documents beginning in 2012-13.

But almost all of the information that appeared in DND's report was gone. What we were left with was little more than a short boilerplate description of the agency, the overall number for the coming fiscal year only, and — the only new piece of information provided — the spending numbers for the SIGINT program and the ITSEC program. So, one step forward and about ten steps backward.

CSE's public affairs people somehow managed to call this "enhanced" reporting. I suppose that's what public affairs people get paid to do, but for an agency that wants Canadians to take a lot of what they say on trust, this was not their finest hour.

Among the information that was no longer reported was the number of FTEs, but that loss at least was mitigated by the fact that CSE's staff numbers were still being reported on a monthly basis by the Treasury Board Secretariat.

But then that ended in February 2016.

I don't think that change, which affected reporting on staff numbers at all government departments and agencies, was prompted by CSE, and when I had a chance in November 2016 to ask Dom Rochon, CSE's Deputy Chief, Policy and Communications, whether CSE would consider publishing the figures itself, he seemed open to the idea. But it hasn't happened.

So that went dark too.

(To be fair, out of date annual figures are available on INFOBASE.)

And now we're losing formal, and timely, publication of the SIGINT/ITSEC breakdown.

As one who has often seen important information posted and then later removed from government websites, I find its promised publication after the fact in online form, while much better than nothing, far from entirely reassuring. If MPs insist on getting the numbers on the record at the beginning of every fiscal year at committee that will help a great deal.

But it would be better, and much more reliable, to simply publish them as before. Is this really so hard to do?



[This post was updated on 18 April 2018 in light of the information provided by CSE.]

Monday, April 09, 2018

The hunt for GHOSTHUNTER



In September 2016, The Intercept published this image taken by a U.S. photoreconnaissance satellite of an unidentified city. An ellipse overlaid on the image showed the estimated location of a target Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite dish as determined by the GHOSTHUNTER program. (You can read more about GHOSTHUNTER in The Intercept's article: Ryan Gallagher, "Inside Menwith Hill: The NSA’s British Base at the Heart of U.S. Targeted Killing," The Intercept, 6 September 2016).

A couple of days ago I decided it might be interesting to determine exactly where that city is. Knowing its location might enable us to discover which satellite — probably one of the massive ORION satellites in geosynchronous orbit — had produced the VSAT location estimate, and it would also enable us to make an accurate measurement of the ellipse. The location might also provide some insight into the kinds of targets these capabilities were being used against.

But how to identify the city? My first thought was to use the shadows in the image. The exact date and time the image was taken (28 January 2009 at 05:16Z, with Z meaning Greenwich Mean Time) is shown on the image, and so is a north arrow. I figured measuring the direction of the shadows should enable me to determine a more or less north-south line on the globe along which the city ought to be located. The tricky part is that the satellite photo was taken from an angle (which means, for example, that the streets don't intersect at right angles in the image, even though it seems likely that they do in real life), making it difficult to measure the angle of the shadows accurately.



Skewing the image to make the street layout rectangular produced the image shown above, from which I determined the direction of the sun to be around 126.5 degrees, probably plus or minus at least a couple of degrees because of the imprecision of the whole process.

That measurement in turn produced an estimated line of location that extended along the western shores of the Caspian Sea down through Azerbaijan and western Iran and across the eastern part of the Arabian peninsula, curving a bit to the east as it proceeded southwards.

That seemed like a pretty good place to start, so I fired up Google Earth and had a look.

Sadly, nothing I could find looked like the city in the photo. In fact, none of the cities near my search line featured architecture remotely resembling that in the image, with its numerous open courtyards and long sections of roof constructed of multiple vaults in series. Clearly something was off.

So on to Plan B: Widen the search area and find the cities with that kind of architecture.

I did find similar-looking vaulted roofs in parts of eastern Iran. But there was still no city that really resembled the target.

Herat, in Afghanistan, however, was another matter. Although still not the right city, it was much, much closer to the right style. So it was time to take a closer look at Afghanistan.


Home, home in Zaranj

A point-by-point search of small cities in western Afghanistan led eventually to Zaranj, in the southwestern part of the country just a couple of kilometres from the border with Iran.



Here you can see the spy satellite image overlaid on the Google Earth image. It's a match!

...about 1000 km to the east of my initial line of search. So, what went wrong with the shadow method? It turns out the spy satellite image was not only skewed, it was also stretched along the east-west axis. As can be seen in the formerly circular logos in this version, the image had to be compressed to match the underlying Google Earth photo. That changes the angle of the shadows, which now indicate the direction of the sun to be about 135 degrees, not 126.5. A search along the line determined by that information, through western Afghanistan and Pakistan's Balochistan province, would have sped things up considerably. But I don't see any way to have determined the necessary correction ahead of time.

Anyway, we now have a spy satellite photo newly identified to be of Zaranj.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Zaranj turns out to be the kind of burg where a lot of activity that might be of interest to intelligence agencies takes place. This 2012 article, titled "The Scariest Little Corner of the World" (Luke Mogelson, New York Times Magazine, 18 October 2012), takes a fascinating look at the city and the region around it. Between the Hazaras, Tajiks, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Afghan Baluchis, other Afghans, Pakistani Baluchis, other Pakistanis, Iranian Baluchis, other Iranians, Indians, Americans, other NATO forces, and, going back a ways, the Soviets, a lot has been going on. I won't even try to summarize it all here.


Analysis of the ellipse

As noted above, the ellipse on the photo shows the estimated location of a VSAT satellite dish that the NSA or other SIGINT agencies were monitoring and wanted to geolocate. Several candidate dishes that were found within the ellipse are highlighted, but it is not clear whether any of these dishes were singled out as probably being the target dish.

The long axis of the ellipse is oriented towards the southeast at an angle of about 134 degrees, which is quite close to the direction of the sun at the time the photo was taken, but that's just a coincidence. What is probably not a coincidence is that it also points pretty much exactly in the direction of the U.S. ORION 2 geosynchronous SIGINT satellite.

[Update 11 April 2018: Actually, it probably is a coincidence. As Marco Langbroek helpfully pointed out, the ellipse probably represents the location estimated by monitoring the VSAT dish from two SIGINT satellites at the same time, which means it very likely doesn't point in the direction of either one of them. As he noted, this document confirms that two satellites are used when making such estimates. So, sadly, it may not be possible to determine precisely which of the geosynchronous SIGINT satellites were involved in this case.

But Marco was able to identify the photoreconnaissance satellite involved: "I could positively identify the optical reconnaissance satellite that made the photographic image as USA 129 (1996-072A), a classified KH-11 "Keyhole" electro-optical reconnaissance satellite that made a pass over Zaranj at the given date and time based on amateur tracking data." Thanks, Marco!]

The size of the resulting ellipse will vary in each particular case according to the geometry of the intercepts and other factors, but this example gives an indication of how precisely SIGINT satellites can geolocate a transmitting VSAT dish. As measured in Google Earth, the ellipse is around 207 metres wide by 465 metres long, and thus covers an area of about 75,600 square metres, roughly seven and a half hectares. The data box attached to the ellipse originally provided a figure, redacted by The Intercept, for CEP, which is an abbreviation for circular error probable. This probably means that the ellipse depicts the area within which the dish was estimated to have a 50% chance of being located.


That's pretty impressive precision when you consider that these satellites orbit at an altitude of nearly 36,000 km and the slant range to their targets is even greater.


There may be other details that can be learned from a close examination of this image, but those are the obvious ones that come to my mind. Suggestions for other points [and other corrections] would be welcomed.

Nearly half a century after the first geosynchronous SIGINT satellite was launched (CANYON 1 on 6 August 1968), it's nice to learn a little bit more about how they operate.

Sunday, March 11, 2018

INMARSAT monitored at Gander



This map, taken from an NSA document recently published by The Intercept, shows the footprints of the fourth generation INMARSAT satellites, which provide telephone and data services primarily to mobile users (ships, aircraft, and handheld satellite phone users). The map also shows 28 ground locations, evidently depicting the sites where the Five Eyes partners monitor the key spot beams serving regions of interest to those agencies. One of those locations corresponds to CFB Gander, the home of CFS Leitrim Detachment Gander, a Canadian SIGINT site known primarily for its huge FRD-10 antenna array. The Gander detachment is remotely operated from Leitrim, which presumably processes the INMARSAT traffic collected at Gander.

The document is undated, but it was probably produced around 2011 ± 2 years, i.e., after the launch of the three satellites whose footprints are shown on the map but before the next generation of satellites began to join them in orbit.

The 28 ground sites are unlabeled, but it is clear that they are not intended to represent INMARSAT users, who are predominately to be found in ocean areas (at sea or in the air) and in remote, poorly serviced land areas. Instead, they correspond to known Five Eyes SIGINT collection sites, either long-standing intercept stations or known locations of monitoring facilities hidden in embassies.

The intercept stations are Bude, U.K.; Cyprus; Hawaii; Misawa, Japan; Shoal Bay, Australia; Sugar Grove, West Virginia; Waihopai, New Zealand; Yakima, Washington; and Gander. (Sugar Grove and Yakima have since closed, but they were active at the time this map seems to have been produced.)

The remaining 19 locations are all in non-Five Eyes capital cities that are known to host or to have hosted intercept facilities: Algiers, Algeria; Baghdad, Iraq; Bangkok, Thailand; Beijing, China; Bogota, Colombia; Brasilia, Brazil; Caracas, Venezuela; Islamabad, Pakistan; Kinshasa, D.R. Congo; Lusaka, Zambia; Madrid, Spain; Managua, Nicaragua; Manila, Philippines; Mexico City, Mexico; Monrovia, Liberia; Moscow, Russia; Nairobi, Kenya; New Delhi, India; and Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.

This map of monitoring facilities operated by the Special Collection Service in U.S. diplomatic sites shows that in 2010 the U.S. was present in all but one of these locations, Port Moresby. (One other site, Monrovia, was listed as dormant at that time.) Port Moresby is reported to host an ASD listening post in the Australian High Commission, so in that case the INMARSAT monitoring is probably conducted from that location. Some of the other capital cities shown on the map also host non-U.S. sites in addition to SCS sites, so it is possible that INMARSAT monitoring is conducted by other Five Eyes parties in some of those locations as well.

It is, I think, entirely unsurprising to find evidence that Canada is involved in INMARSAT monitoring. I suspect we've been at it since the 1990s, or even the 1980s, probably using antennas at Leitrim and possibly other locations as well as Gander. INMARSAT communications monitored from Gander probably pertain mainly to the region off Canada's East Coast, and to the Western North Atlantic more generally, where activities such as human and narcotics smuggling and illegal fishing would be considered important targets for intelligence collection.

Wednesday, March 07, 2018

Privacy Commissioner also calls for changes to Bill C-59

Privacy Commissioner Daniel Therrien has also called for changes to Bill C-59.

In a letter dated 5 March 2018, Therrien recommended 11 amendments to the bill, including two pertaining specifically to the CSE Act's provisions on the acquisition and use of "publicly available information":

"RECOMMENDATION 10: That section 24 [of the CSE Act] be amended to add a limit to the activities listed in 24(1) namely: the measures shall be reasonable and proportional in the circumstances, having regard to the reasonable foreseeable effects on Canadians and people in Canada including on their right to privacy"; and

"RECOMMENDATION 11: That the definition of “publicly available information” in section 2 of Part 3 be amended to specify that information is published or broadcast lawfully, and that information obtained through purchase or subscription was legally obtained or created by the vendor."

Explanations for these recommendations can be found in the Commissioner's letter.

The Commissioner Therrien also expressed his support for one of the recommendations made by the CSE Commissioner in January:

"We note that, in his brief provided to the Committee on December 6, 2017, the Commissioner for CSE recommended that the Intelligence Commissioner 'should approve the active cyber operations in addition to the defensive cyber operations that are authorized by the Minister pursuant to subsections 30(1) and 31(1) of the proposed Communications Security Establishment Act.' We agree with this recommendation, as it addresses a gap in the Intelligence Commissioner's authority to approve activities under all CSE mandates."


News coverage:

Alex Boutilier, "Ottawa’s privacy watchdog wants limits on spies’ information collecting powers," Toronto Star, 8 March 2018.


Wednesday, February 28, 2018

CSE wins big in 2018 budget

The 2018 budget, tabled by the Finance Minister on February 27th, promises some big spending boosts for the Communications Security Establishment over the next five years, with additional money pledged for both the IT Security and the SIGINT programs.

For starters, the government is promising to spend $507.7 million over the next five years, and $108.8 million per year thereafter, to fund a new National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS). $155.2 million of that sum, and $44.5 million per year ongoing, will be provided to CSE to create a new Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (see pages 203-205):
By consolidating operational cyber expertise from across the federal government under one roof, the new Canadian Centre for Cyber Security will establish a single, unified Government of Canada source of unique expert advice, guidance, services and support on cyber security operational matters, providing Canadian citizens and businesses with a clear and trusted place to turn to for cyber security advice. In order to establish the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, the Government will introduce legislation to allow various Government cyber security functions to consolidate into the new Centre. Federal responsibility to investigate potential criminal activities will remain with the RCMP.
To carry out its responsibilities, the RCMP will get a new National Cybercrime Coordination Unit funded to the tune of $116.0 million over five years, and $23.2 million per year after that.

The rest of the NCSS money, $236.5 million over five years and $41.2 million per year after that, will go "to further support Canada’s new National Cyber Security Strategy." At the moment, however, it appears that none of that additional money will flow CSE's way.

Even more money will be provided to "modernize/enhance the Government’s digital services" (see page 206): "$2.2 billion over six years, starting in 2018–19, with $349.8 million per year thereafter, [will be spent] to improve the management and provision of IT services and infrastructure within the Government of Canada, and to support related cyber security measures." Most of that cash will be going to Shared Services Canada, but an unspecified portion of it is promised to CSE.

[Update 28 February 2018: According to the Defence Minister's office, CSE will receive a total of $16 million over six years from this funding.]

Meanwhile, new money is also promised to the SIGINT program (see page 208): "In order to keep pace with rapid technological change that can challenge its ability to effectively collect foreign signals intelligence, the Government proposes to provide the Communications Security Establishment $225 million over four years, starting in 2020–21, and $62.1 million ongoing, to ensure this capability is preserved."

If these promised budget boosts are fully implemented, the new IT Security and SIGINT money will eventually total an extra $106.6 million a year for CSE, plus whatever money comes from the digital services initiative and any additional National Cyber Security Strategy money that ends up in CSE's coffers. [The information I received from the Minister's office indicates that these amounts will be minimal.] If no other changes are made to CSE's budget in the interim, this would represent an increase about 18%—large, but not quite of the scale of the increase (25%) the agency received in the immediate wake of 9/11.

Even at 18%, it is likely that the new funding will mean significant new growth in CSE's staff. Currently at about 2300 employees, the agency could eventually grow to 2700 or even more, although it is possible that a significant number of those bodies might end up working for contractors instead and thus wouldn't appear on the employee rolls. The SIGINT side alone could easily expand by 300 people, which would enable development of a significant Computer Network Attack capability as well as support growth of more traditional intelligence-gathering activities.

These are pretty big numbers.

For now, however, most of the money exists only in the political fantasyland of distant budget-year promises. We probably won't even know what all of this means for the fiscal year about to start until the 2018-19 Main Estimates are released, which, according to this new thing called Interim Estimates, could be as late as mid-April. Stay tuned for that.

The government's decision to dedicate significant additional resources to national cyber security and to concentrate that effort in one organization, much as the British and some of our other allies have done, is a good one, I think. As to whether it will be sufficient to address the threat, I have no idea. I assume we'll get some more details of what precisely is proposed whenever the National Cyber Security Strategy itself is released.

I'm undecided on the question of whether CSE should be the agency where the national cyber security effort is concentrated. CSE certainly has most of the expertise on this subject now, and to the extent that cyber security draws on intelligence-gathering efforts to detect, attribute, and counter such activities its involvement may be essential. But CSE's other mandates also pull it in the opposite direction, away for example from initiatives that might have the effect of making cyberspace as a whole a more secure place.

The fact that the same budget is promising to boost the SIGINT program—so as to preserve and/or increase Canada's ability to conduct its own Computer Network Exploitation and Attack operations—throws this whole aspect into rather stark relief. Intelligence-gathering is certainly valuable. The net benefits of CNA I'm less convinced about.

But as to whether those various imperatives are best balanced within a single agency or among two or even three agencies at the Cabinet/PCO level is, I think, a serious question that we seem at the moment to be answering by default.


News coverage:

Alex Boutilier, "Liberals pitch $500 million cyber security plan," Toronto Star, 27 February 2018.

Murray Brewster, "Federal budget shores up cyber defences but is silent on new jets and warships," CBC News, 27 February 2018.

Carl Meyer, "Budget targets 'increasingly sophisticated' cyber attacks on government," National Observer, 27 February 2018.

Jim Bronskill & Lee Berthiaume, "New federal cybersecurity strategy follows 'overlap, lack of clarity'," Canadian Press, 28 February 2018.


Monday, February 26, 2018

Canada's initial post-war SIGINT targets

When CSE, then called the Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC), began operations in September 1946, it had four SIGINT targets.

Set in consultation with Canada's U.S. and U.K. allies, those initial targets were selected primarily to provide a range of different training opportunities for the new agency. As the official History of CBNRC described it, "The basic purpose of these tasks was to provide initial training in producing intelligence from a variety of foreign communications and cipher systems."

Kurt Jensen's 2008 book Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence, 1939-51 identified those initial targets in general terms: "The cryptanalysis unit would focus on Europe, the Far East, and South America. The prime decryption assignments were in the French, Spanish, and Chinese languages, with only the latter representing a departure from wartime interests."

In fact, there was one other significant language in use... Portuguese.

Brazilian Portuguese.

The released versions of the History of CBNRC, particularly the 2015 release, provide a number of details about those initial tasks, but the identities of specific countries/languages tasked are redacted, meaning you have to work a bit to figure them out.

The best clues are to be found in the 2015 document's largely unredacted index, which has four significant gaps where the entries for Brazilian, Chinese, French, and Spanish used to be. As it happens, the 1990s release of the History redacted the names of those entries but not the lists of locations where the terms actually appear in the text. Thus, it is possible to check hypothesized names against the redacted terms in the 2015 text to see if their length and context make sense.

In the case of French, it is even possible to find the term unredacted in certain paragraphs (those that discuss bilingualism in the public service). The fact that no other term in those paragraphs matches the Fairley-to-GCCS gap in the index confirms that the redacted entry is indeed French. Chinese also appears once in the text in similar circumstances.

Collateral information, such as Marcel Roussin's background as a specialist in Latin American diplomatic history, is also helpful for solidifying the identifications.

With the four broad targets identified it is possible to fill in several of the blanks in the document, which in turn reveals a number of additional interesting details about these tasks:
  • The Spanish task was focused on Spanish naval forces and depended to a significant degree on traffic collected by GCHQ. This quickly proved to be a problem. Higher priorities forced GCHQ to drop its coverage of the Spanish target by the beginning of 1947, leading CBNRC to abandon the Spanish task not long afterward. (It was replaced by CBNRC's first Russian task.)
  • The French task focused on French military (i.e., army) and naval traffic. The Examination Unit had done a lot of work on both Vichy French and Free French systems during the war, so this was an area where Canada already had some experience. The French task also suffered from reductions in collection by GCHQ, however, and in October 1950 the decision was made to phase it out in favour of more Russian work.
  • The focus of the Brazilian task is not clear. It may have included diplomatic or commercial traffic instead of or in addition to service traffic. The Brazilian task remained active until November 1956.
  • The Chinese task, which seems to have consisted mostly of civil traffic, was the last to go, being dropped in November 1957. The end of the Chinese task coincided with CBNRC's decision, taken in conjunction with NSA and GCHQ, to focus the Canadian SIGINT effort from that time on almost entirely on the Soviet Arctic.


Tuesday, February 06, 2018

Five Eyes SIGINT governance: Meetings galore

The relationship among the Five Eyes SIGINT agencies is extraordinarily close. It is not that uncommon for intelligence agencies to cooperate with their foreign counterparts in limited ways on specific topics of mutual interest, but the depth and breadth of cooperation among the "Second Parties" to the UKUSA Agreement is truly remarkable.

Each of the five agencies that participate—NSA, GCHQ, CSE, ASD, and GCSB—remains an independent entity under national control and responding to national intelligence priorities, but in many respects they also work as a single, supranational entity, setting common goals, building interoperable systems, and sharing technology, people, and, to an extraordinarily large degree, raw and assessed intelligence.

Born in the darkest days of the Second World War and institutionalized for the post-war era by the BRUSA Agreement (subsequently renamed UKUSA) of 5 March 1946, the UKUSA community has only grown closer and more tightly integrated in the decades up to the present. In addition to the UKUSA Agreement and other, subsidiary agreements (notably the CANUSA Agreement), the allies jointly set common Strategic Directions, adopt Resolutions at consultative meetings, and sign memoranda of understanding on common projects and programs. Personnel serve on exchange inside allied collection, processing, and analysis sites, take training courses at allied facilities, and work in permanent liaison offices established at each other's agencies to ensure continued close cooperation. The agencies are even able to task some of the collection systems operated by their allies. Much of the metadata and in some cases raw content of the SIGINT the agencies collect is made accessible to the partners, and most of the SIGINT reports issued by the agencies—some 500 per day—are shared among the partners.

Senior executives of the agencies consult among themselves whenever major issues arise, hold regular monthly, in some cases weekly, teleconferences, attend annual meetings as a group, and also hold frequent bilateral meetings. Lower-level committees meet regularly to work out specific problems, facilitate specific areas of cooperation, or run shared programs, and regular conferences are held to share information or tradecraft. In the wake of 9/11, as the allies sought to extend their intelligence cooperation even further and move from the traditional ethos of "need to know" to a new one of "need to share", the number and nature of these meetings and conferences proliferated.

The internal newsletter of NSA's Signals Intelligence Division, SID Today, leaked by Edward Snowden, provides some insight into this aspect of UKUSA cooperation. I did a review of the SID Today articles written over the two-year period between June 2003 and May 2005 and found references to 49 conferences or other meetings involving the participation of two or more Five Eyes members. (The source articles can be found here.)



Note that this list contains only those meetings mentioned in SID Today. Thus, in addition to those NSA-related SIGINT meetings that may have gone unmentioned, it excludes all meetings pertaining to the cybersecurity activities of the agencies and most of the bilateral SIGINT meetings in which NSA was not a participant.

Several of the meetings listed (those marked with an asterisk) were described as the first in an ongoing annual series on that topic, demonstrating the extent to which consultation and sharing was expanding at this time. Many of the other meetings listed were already annual.

Broader Five Eyes relationship

The Five Eyes cooperative relationship is no longer merely an arrangement among cryptologic agencies. The partnership may have begun with SIGINT, but extensive intelligence-sharing has also long occurred among the Five Eyes' security-intelligence, human-intelligence, and military-intelligence agencies, both at the operations level and at the level of multi-source assessed intelligence, up to and sometimes including National Intelligence Estimates and equivalent documents. More recently, formal Five Eyes fora have also been created in such areas as law enforcement cooperation and critical infrastructure protection.

Sometimes these fora have also been extended, at least for limited purposes, to include other countries. The SIGINT Seniors Europe and SIGINT Seniors Pacific groupings are example of this development in the signals intelligence sphere.

I imagine the recent report that France has become part of a "Five Eyes plus France" group that meets one or more times a year in Washington (Pierre Tran, "French official details intelligence-sharing relationship with Five Eyes," Defense News, 5 February 2018) is an example of that trend with respect to broader intelligence cooperation. What I do not think it heralds, however, is anything remotely like the deep, wide-ranging, and day-to-day integration of activities that characterizes the unique SIGINT relationship among the UKUSA five.